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CRIMINAL LAW-SEzuRE OF ALLEGEDLY OBSCENE MATERIAL-REQUREMENT
OF A PRIoR ADvRSARY HEAUNG-State v. Brooke, 24 Ohio Misc. 125, 259
N.E.2d 760 (C. P. Montgomery County 1970); State v. Miqdadi, 24 Ohio Misc.
46, 263 N.E.2d 417 (Franklin County Mun. Ct. 1970).
In Brooke, a police officer purchased from the defendant at a local bookstore
a reel of movie film.1 The officer examined the film, determined that it was hard
core pornography, and arrested the defendant for the sale of a lewd, obscene, and
lascivious film 2 Police then obtained a search warrant from a magistrate to search
the trunk of the defendant's automobile for additional material. The affidavit in
support of the warrant, offered by the officer who had made the arrest, was based
on information and belief of fellow officers who had received their information
from alleged confidential informants.3
The Common Pleas Court of Montgomery County held that both the arrest and
the search were unlawful. The court said that the United States Supreme Court
had mandated that a search warrant authorizing the seizure of all allegedly obscene
material issued without a prior adversary hearing to determine whether the material
is obscene is constitutionally deficient,4 citing A Quantity of Books v. Kansas5 and
Marcus v. Search Warrant.6 The court related a similar proscription to the arrest,
saying that the police officer must first take the film that he purchased from the de-
fendant to a magistrate. A hearing must be held at which the defendant is given
an opportunity to be heard. If the magistrate then finds that the material is ob-
scene, he may issue an arrest warrant.7
The defendant in Miqdadi also was arrested for a violation of Section 2905.34.8
Three police officers had viewed the two magazines in question at defendant's
bookstore. The arrest warrant was issued on the basis of an affidavit setting forth
the officers' conclusion that the books were obscene.8 The defendant sought to
void the arrests and to quash the affidavits and the arrest warrants, contending that
he was entitled to a judicial hearing before the arrest.' 8 The Franklin County
Municipal Court rejected that contention. The court said that A Quantity of Books
and Marcus, relied on by the defendant, were not precisely in point because they
involved search warrants." In addition, the court objected to the fact that it was
being asked to adopt a procedure not provided for by state statute or court rules.'2
Brooke and Miqdadi, though quite disparate in their outcomes, are representa-
tive of the range of decisions that has been reached by lower courts under existing
Supreme Court guidelines. Much of the confusion emanates from two Supreme
124 Ohio Misc. 125, 126, 259 N.E.2d 760, 761 (1970).
2 The actions in both Brooke and Miqdadi were brought under § 2905.34 of the Ohio Re-
vised Code. See OmIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.35 (Page Supp. 1970) which superseded §
2905.34 shortly after the two cases were decided. The two statutes are essentially similar.
3 State v. Brooke, 24 Ohio Misc. 125, 126, 259 N.E.2d 760, 762 (1970).
4Id. at 127, 259 N..2d at 762.
5 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
6 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
7 State v. Brooke 24 Ohio Misc. 125, 127-28, 259 N.E.2d 760, 762-63 (1970).
8 See note 2, supra.
9 State v. Miqdadi, 24 Ohio Misc. 46,47, 263 N..2d 417, 418 (1970).
10 Id.
11 Id. These cases were also distinguished as being aimed at the prevention of the seizure
of quantities of material for destruction, rather than the seizure of a single copy for evidentiary
purposes. Id. at 50-51, 263 N.E.2d at 420.
12 Id. at 48, 263 N.X.2d at 418.
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Court decisions of the early 1960's, Marcus v. Search Warrant'3 and A Quantity of
Books v. Kansas.14 Both decisions voided state procedures 15 for seizing allegedly
obscene material. In Marcus, search warrants were issued which gave the police
authority to seize any material which they considered obscene.1 None of the pub-
lications that was subsequently seized had been seen by the judge who issued the
warrant. Acting under the warrant the police seized 11,000 copies of 280 pub-
lications.'7 The Supreme Court of the United States said that the procedure lacked
the safeguards which due process demands when constitutionally protected speech
is involved.' 8 The Court stated that the procedure used in such circumstances
must be "designed to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity."' 9 The pro-
cedure followed in A Quantity of Books was similar, except for the fact that the
judge who issued the warrant had scrutinized some but not most of the titles that
were seized.20 The High Court said the procedure was inadequate because it al-
lowed a mass seizure without a prior adversary hearing on the question of
obscenity.21
Unlike Brooke and Miqdadi, however, Marcus and A Quantity of Books in-
volved mass seizures for destruction, and this aspect of the two cases has been
seized upon by lower courts that have distinguished them. The Supreme Court
has not provided the needed darification by spelling out in some detail the re-
quisite procedure. It has chosen instead to strike down existing procedures which
it determines fall short of constitutional requirements. 22
Lower courts have taken a variety of positions on the validity of the actions in-
volved in Brooke and Miqdadi. Not all courts have agreed that an arrest without a
warrant or a prior adversary hearing, as in Brooke, is invalid.23 Those courts
which have held such arrests to be unconstitutional have done so on the ground
that a judicial determination of some type is necessary to constitute due process.24
Some of these courts would allow an exception, however, when there is not ample
time for prior scrutiny of the material, as in the case of a one-night screening or in
some other circumstance where there is a high probability that the evidence may be
lost, destroyed, or removed.2 5
13 267 US. 717 (1961).
14 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
15 Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 719 & nn.2, 3 (1961); A Quantity of Books v.
Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 208-09 (1964).
16 Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1961).
17 Id. at 723.
181d, at 731.
11 Id. at 732.20 A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 208 (1964). In A Quantity of Books 1,715
copies of 31 books were seized. Id. at 205.
211d. at 210.
2 See Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636 (1968), in which the Court held in-
adequate a procedure under which a search warrant had been issued solely on the basis of the con-
clusory assertions of the police officer without any inquiry by the justice of the peace ino the fac-
tual basis for the officer's conclusion.
23 State v. Bongiorno, 103 N.J. Super. 515, 247 A.2d 893 (1968); People v. Lake Ronkon-
koma Theater, 59 Misc.2d 438, 299 N.Y.S.2d 545 (1969).
24 I lack v. Municipal Court for Anahein-Fullerton J.D., 66 Cal.2d 981, 991,'429 P.2d 192,
198, 59 Cal. Rptr. 872, 878 (1967); Drive In Theatres, Inc. v. Huskey, 305 F. Supp. 1232, 1234
(W.D. N.C. 1969); People v. Kozak, 56 Misc.2d 337, 340, 288 N.Y.S.2d 692, 695 (1968).
2 5 Flack v. Municipal Court for Anaheim-Fullerton J.D., 66 Cal. 2d 981, 991, 429 P.2d 192,
198, 59 Cal. Rptr. 872, 878 (1967).
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When the arrest search or seizure follows a determination of probable cause
by a magistrate, the courts have been much more reluctant to strike down the action.
The search warrant in Brooke and the arrest warrant in Miqdadi were issued after
a finding of probable cause by a magistrate. Search warrants lacking particularity
have been struck down, however, on the rationale that courts were allowing the
police to usurp the role of the bench.2 6 The Fourth Circuit has invalidated a search
warrant issued by a magistrate who viewed the film in question, but did not con-
duct a prior adversary hearing.27 Other courts, however, have found such a proce-
dure adequate to protect nonobscene materials.28 Some courts, moreover, have up-
held warrants issued solely on the affidavit of a police officer.2 9 The fact that the
officer's supporting statement contained detailed descriptions of the material and
not merely his conclusory assertions has been considered decisive.30  If a fourth
amendment violation was claimed, the usual motion for return or for suppression
as evidence has been considered to be the appropriate remedy.3 ' The search war-
rant in Brooke and the arrest warrant in Miqdadi were issued on the affidavits of
police officers.
Courts that have accepted at least the approximation of a prior adversary hear-
ing have encountered various problems in implementing that procedure. The court
in Miqdadi dwells at considerable length on the potential procedural consequences
and problems in conducting a prior adversary hearing. One approach has been to
serve the accused with a witness subpoena ordering him to appear at a hearing
and with a subpoena duces tecum ordering him to bring to the hearing copies of
the allegedly obscene material. 2 When the contempt power was used to enforce
the subpoena duces tecum, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, say-
ing that before a subpoena can be issued there must be some pre-existing matter or
cause before the court.m The Supreme Court said that broad as the jurisdiction
of the lower courts may be, those courts are not possessed of the power to originate
this "kind of judicial or investigatory proceedings."3 4
Courts that have gone on record as requiring a prior adversary hearing before
material may be seized, have tempered that requirement by ordering the accused
to make a copy available to the prosecution, upon request, for use in preparation
26 U.S. v. Marti, 421 F.2d 1263 (2d Cir. 1970); People v. Rothenberg, 20 N.Y.2d 35, 228
N.E.2d 379, 281 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1967). In Marti the warrant specified that police officers could
seize any material which they thought to be obscene. The court went on to say, however, that the
warrant could have specified material depicting natural or unnatural sex acts, implying that such
broad language was particular enough to satisfy constitutional requirements. 421 F.2d 1263,
1268.
2 7 Tyrone, Inc., v. Wilkinson, 410 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 985
(1969). Even though the Fourth Circuit directed the return of the film in question, it also re-
quired the theater to make available a copy of the film for the preparation and the trial of the
pending criminal cases. Id. at 641.
2SPeople v. Hall, 60 Misc2d 850, 304 N.Y.S.2d 379 (1969); People v. Steinberg, 60
Misc.2d 1041, 304 N.Y.S.2d 858 (1969).29 Monica Theater v. Mun. Ct. for Beverly Hills J.D., 9 Cal. App. 3d 1, 88 Cal. Rptr. 71
(1970); Commonwealth v. State Amusement Corp., 248 N.E.2d 497 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass.
1969).
30 Commonwealth v. State Amusement Corp., 248 N.E.2d 497 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. 1969).
31 Monica Theater v. Mun. Ct. for Beverly Hills J.D., 9 Cal. App. 3d 1, 88 Cal. Rptr. 71
(1970).
32 Commonwealth v. Polak, 438 Pa. 67, 263 A.2d 354 (1970).




for the trial or in the trial in a criminal case involving the material in question.35
This process for compelling production of the material has been held to impinge
on the possessor's fifth amendment rights, however.36
Another approach has been for the magistrate to issue a warrant to seize mate-
rial on the basis of an affidavit offered by an investigator, but to follow the seizure
as soon as possible with a determination by the magistrate, with the exhibitor and
his counsel present, as to whether the material is constitutionally protected.ar If the
material is not protected, the exhibitor still loses only a single copy with no restric-
tions on the use of material remaining in his possession until the matter is tried.
This approach avoids the use of a subpoena duces tecum with the resulting prob-
lems. It also serves to maintain intact the usual method of handling criminal pros-
ecutions, while providing for a timely judicial determination aimed at protecting
first amendment values.
Procedures have been sustained that approximated the one approved by the
Supreme Court in Kingsley Books Inc. v. Brown.38 In Kingsley, the applicable state
statute provided for a trial within one day after joinder of the issue and for a de-
cision within two days after the conclusion of the trial. The availability of relief
to the defendant in an obscenity action, whether in the form of a declaratory judg-
ment,3 9 writ of mandamus,40 or temporary restraining order41 has sometimes been
considered to be an adequate safeguard. These remedies have been used to prevent
self-censorship when criminal prosecution is threatened,42 to allow for recovery of
material when there is a strong showing of need such as lack of a duplicate film,43
or to preclude confiscation of a film at its initial showing.4"
Given what the Supreme Court has said and what lower courts have done, an
argument can be advanced that both Brooke and Miqdadi are constitutionally justi-
fiable. If one accepts the most constricted view of the proscription in Marcus and
A Quantity of Books-a prohibition of mass seizures for destruction without a prior
adversary hearing, then both Brooke and Miqdadi could have been distinguished on
that basis. But Marcus and A Quantity of Books contain dear indications of the
importance that the Supreme Court attaches to constructing procedures which will
provide the safeguards that due process demands when constitutionally protected
speech is involved. Whether the procedures involved in the two Ohio cases
are adequate depends on one's view of the breadth of the constitutional safe-
guards laid down by the Court in Marcus and A Quantity of Books. The Brooke
court obviously had little difficulty in deciding that the procedures in question were
of the type which the Supreme Court sought to proscribe. The procedure in Miq-
35 Metzger v. Pearcy, 393 F.2d 202, 204 (7th Cir. 1968); Tyrone Inc. v. Wilkinson, 410 F.2d
639,641 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 985 (1969).
30 People v. DeRenzy, 275 Cal. App. 2d 380, 384, 79 Cal. Rptr. 777, 779 (1969).
3 7 M erritt v. Lewis, 309 F. Supp. 1249, 1253 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
38 354 U.S. 536 (1957).
3 0 Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 59 CaL2d 901, 383 P.2d 152 (1963), 31 Cal. Rptr. 800, cert. denied,
375 U.S. 957 (1963).
40 M onica Theater v. Mun. Ct. for Beverly Hills J.D., 9 Cal. App. 3d 1, 88 Cal. Rptr. 71,
78 (1970).
41 Grove Press, Inc., v. Corrigan, 21 Ohio Misc. 185, 186, 255 N.E.2d 642, 643 (1969).
42 Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 59 Cal.2d 901, 383 P.2d 152 (1963), 31 Cal. Rptr. 800, cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963).43 Monica Theater v. Mun. Ct. for Beverly Hills J.D., 9 Cal. App. 3d 1, 88 Cal. Rptr. 71
(1970).
44 Grove Press, Inc., v. Corrigan, 21 Ohio Misc. 185, 186, 255 N.E.2d 642, 643 (1969).
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dadi is only slightly further removed from those in Brooke, yet the court there
took a contrary view. Miqdadi involved an arrest, not a search and seizure and,
unlike the arrest in Brooke, the arrest was made pursuant to a warrant. The judge
issued the warrant on the affidavit of a police officer, however, and did not scrutinize
the allegedly obscene material. At a minimum, a procedure "designed to focus
searchingly on the question of obscenity," 45 would seem to require that a magis-
trate peruse the material that is the basis for the issuance of an arrest or search
warrant. In neither Brooke or Miqdadi did the magistrate view the material in
question.
The Brooke court, while accepting the need for a prior adversary hearing, does
not say what it would do ifra recalcitrant party refused to attend or bring the mate-
rial in question to such a hearing. Perhaps the court is suggesting, when it says the
accused must be given "an opportunity to appear and be heard,"40 that if the party
chooses not to attend the court will conduct an ex parte hearing. The court did
point out that law enforcement officials have an alternative procedure which could
have been used. The procedure provides the mechanism for seeking an injunc-
tion and entitles the defendant to a speedy trial on the merits.47
The proposed requirement for a prior adversary hearing was criticized in Miq-
dadi for putting the court "in the original position of the police officer." 48  As the
court saw it, the officer is granted by statute the power to make arrests for viola-
tions of the obscenity laws49 and the officer's judgment is the basis of that statute.50
The right of the accused to prove his innocence and the constitutional rights of free
speech and freedom of the press are amply protected, the court said, by that portion
of the statute which provides for a speedy trial on the merits.51 What the court
apparently did not consider is whether a statute is valid that allows a police of-
ficer alone to judge what is obscene, when the High Court has mandated that such
state procedures must be "designed to focus searchingly on the question of obscen-
ity."52
The court in Miqdadi was dubious about the mechanics of prior adversary hear-
ing. Could the court compel the attendance of the parties? Was it arbitrarily to
apply the rules of evidence? Could the court act in a purely quasi-judicial capacity?
The court answered -its own questions by saying that it could assume its judicial
function only when an action is pending and the parties are properly before it.5s
There are procedural uncertainties in conducting a prior adversary hearing, but the
45 Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961).
46 State v. Brooke, 24 Ohio Misc. 125, 127, 259 N.E.2d 760, 762 (1970).
47 The court was referring to § 2905.343 of the Ohio Revised Code. See OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2905.37 (Page Supp. 1970) which superceded § 2905.343 shortly after Brooke was
decided. Section 2905.343 provided in part:
"The court of common pleas has jurisdiction to enjoin the sale or distribution of ob-
scene prints and articles. ... (B) The person, firm or corporation sought to be en-
joined shall be entitled to a trial of the issues within one day after joinder of issue and
a decision shall be rendered by the court within two days of the conclusion of the trial."
Section 2905.37 extended the time limit in each phase to five days.
4 8 State v. Miqdadi, 24 Ohio Misc. 46, 49, 263 N.E.2d 417, 419 (1970).
49 See supra note 2.
50 State v. Miqdadi, 24 Ohio Misc. 46, 50, 263 N.E.2d 417, 420 (1970). The court equated
the obscenity statute with other statutes which permit police officers to act on their own judg-
ment, such as 'those relating to drunken driving, vagrancy, and suspicious persons.
51 See supra note 47.
52 Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961).
53 State v. Miqdadi, 24 Ohio Misc. 46, 49-50,263 N.X.2d 417, 419 (1970).
[Vol. 32
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
court over-reacts to them. The foregoing discussion considered several procedures
which may not equate precisely with a strict concept of a prior adversary hearing,
but do go to minimizing the negative impact of obscenity prosecutions on first
amendment values. They do not have the effect, however, of putting the judge in
the position of a law enforcement officer or of raising insurmountable procedural
barriers to the holding of an efficient hearing.
The issues raised in Brooke and Miqdadi are ones which numerous courts have
considered. The courts' divergent handling of these issues points up the vagueness
of Supreme Court guidelines in this area. This vagueness is not surprising, given
the divergent opinions applying obscenity standards among members of the High
Court. In 13 obscenity cases decided between 1957 and 1966, for example, the
Justices wrote 55 separate opinions.54 A Quantity of Books contains four opin-
ions, though Marcus has only two opinions. Lower courts are not likely to gener-
ally embrace a single rule from these multi-faceted opinions, especially when that
rule must embrace a proposition as controversial as the requirement for a prior ad-
versary hearing. Most lower courts make known an awareness of the requirement but
find it easy to accept significant variations from it. If the Supreme Court was in
fact setting down a hard and fast requirement for a prior adversary hearing when-
ever first amendment values are touched upon, it did not make such an intention
dear nor has it done so in subsequent holdings. Until the High Court presents
its views in a much more dear and precise way than it has done thus far, lower
courts will continue to deal with these issues in a patchwork fashion.
John Charles
CORPORATION LAW-The 1970 Amendments to the Ohio Corporation Law-
Amended Substitute Senate Bill No. 158 became effective July 17, 1970. The pri-
mary effect of this bill was to reorganize prior sections and consolidate in a few
sections provisions which were formerly spread throughout the corporation code.
However, a few of the changes have substantive effect and are not merely reorgan-
izational. This recent development points out changes in the substantive law en-
acted by the bill. A detailed analysis of the reorganization has not been undertaken.
I. CHANGES AFFECTING CORPORATIONS FOR PROFIT
A. Number and Qualification of Incorporators
Section 1701.04 (A) of the Ohio Revised Code' was amended to allow incor-
poration by a single person, not necessarily a natural person, as was previously re-
quired. The incorporator need not be a resident of or domiciled in Ohio nor a
United States citizen. If the incorporator is itself a corporaton it need not be in-
corporated in Ohio. The statute prior to this amendment called for three incor-
porators, all of whom were natural persons and a majority of whom were United
States citizens. Since the financially interested party may now incorporate alone
this change in the law will eliminate the fairly common situation wherein the in-
54 See Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 705 n.1 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring and
dissenting).
1 Oo Rzv. CODE ANN. § 1701.04(A) (Page Supp. 1970). All further references are to
the Ohio Revised Code unless otherwise indicated.
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corporators have no financial interest in the corporation. This provision follows
the Model Business Corporation Act.2
B. Authorization of Broad Purpose Clause
Section 1701.04 (A) (3) was amended to allow a so-called "omnibus purpose
clause" in the articles of incorporation.
(A) rtides of incorporation which shall set forth:
(3) The purpose or purposes for which the corporation is formed, which
may consist of a statement that the purpose, either alone or with other spe-
cified purposes is to engage in any lawful act or activity for which corpo-
rations may be formed .... a
This type of purpose clause has been authorized in many jurisdictions and is a pro-
vision of the Model Business Corporation Act 4 It removes any uncertainty as to
what acts the corporation may undertake and avoids the necessity for lengthy de-
tailed purpose clauses.
In connection with this authorization of a broad purpose clause section 1701.74(D) was amended to deny relief to shareholders dissenting to a change in the pur-
pose clause of a corporation incorporated after December 31, 1970. The reason
given for this denial of relief is that with broad purpose clauses now common
the minority shareholders should not be surprised by a change in purpose. The
change must still be approved by a two-thirds affirmative vote of shareholders, or
any proportion greater than a majority if so provided in the articles.
C. Payment of Stock Dividend on Treasury Shares
Section 1701.33(G) as amended provides that a corporation may pay a stock
dividend on treasury shares of the same class when dividends are to be paid in
authorized but unissued shares of the corporation. This changes the prior law
which held that treasury shares were not outstanding for dividend purposes. Pay-
ment of a stock dividend need no longer change the proportionate amount of the
shares held by the corporation as treasury shares. The definition of "treasury
shares," section 1701.01 (K), has been amended to include the shares paid as a
stock dividend on treasury shares.
D. Minimum Number of Directors
Section 1701.56 (A) as amended changes the pre-existing law to the extent
that the minimum number of directors may now be less than three. If there are
one or two record owners of all the shares of the corporation there may be less
than three directors but no fewer than the number of shareholders. For example,
if a corporaton has a single shareholder of record the minimum number of directors
allowable is one. If a corporation has three or more record shareholders there
must be at least three directors. The Model Act also authorizes fewer than three
directors.5
2ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 53 (1969).
3 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.04(A)(3) (Page Supp. 1970).
4 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 3 (1969).
5 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 36 (1969).
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E. Power of Directors to Amend Articles of Incorporation
Section 1701.70 (B) (5) has been amended to clarify what provisions the
directors may amend out of the articles of incorporation. If, after a merger or
consolidation, the surviving corporation is a domestic corporation the directors may
amend the articles to eliminate only such provisions pertaining exclusively to the
merger or consolidation or which were required to be set forth in the agreement of
merger or consolidation and would not be required in the original articles or amend-
ments thereto. The previous wording allowed the directors to amend out "any state-
ment or matter which was required or permitted to be set forth in the agreement of
merger or consolidation."O The scope of this authority was unclear and could have
been interpreted to allow the directors to amend out any matter not required by the
original articles or amendments thereto. It is now clear that only those provisions
incident to the merger or consolidation may be deleted by the directors.
F. Reorganization of Provisions Relating to Mergers and Consolidations
In amending the Ohio Corporation Act the legislature has made extensive reor-
ganizational, and some substantive changes, in those sections dealing with mergers
and consolidations. Previous Revised Code sections 1701.78, 1701.79, 1701.80,
1701.81, 1701.82, 1701.83, 1701.831, 1701.84 and 1701.85 have been repealed.
The new sections bearing those same numbers are better organized and slightly
modified to conform with current corporate practices.
(1) Merger or Consolidation into a Domestic Corporation-
Section 1701.78
New section 1701.78 combines previous Code sections 1701.78 and 1701.79
and deals with the merger or consolidation of foreign or domestic constituent cor-
porations into a surviving domestic corporation. Subsection (B) of 1701.78 requires
that the merger or consolidation agreement shall set forth: (a) the state under
the laws of which each constituent corporation exists; (b) that one or more con-
stituent corporations shall be merged or consolidated into a named domestic corpo-
ration; (c) all provisions with respect to the new corporation which would be
required in the original articles of a domestic corporation; (d) all statements re-
quired to be set forth by each state under the laws of which any constituent corpo-
ration exists; (e) if a merger, a statement of the names of the continuing or new
directors and, if a consolidation, the names of the first directors of the new corpo-
ration; (f) the regulations of the new corporation or a provision stating that the
regulations of a specified constituent corporation shall become those of the surviv-
ing corporation; (g) the name and address of an agent upon whom process may
be served; and (h) the terms of the merger or consolidation, the mode of carrying
them into effect and the manner of making distributions to the shareholders of the
constituent corporations.
Subsection (C) lists items which may be set forth in the merger or consolida-
tion agreement. Subsection (D) provides that the agreement must be approved by
the directors of each constituent corporation and by the directors and shareholders
of each domestic constituent corporation. A merger agreement need not be ap-
proved by the shareholders of the surviving corporation unless one or more of the
following conditions exist: (1) The articles of the surviving corporation require
6 OHIo REv. CoDE ANN. § 1701.70(B)(5)(a) as amended, OmIo REV. CODE ANN. §
1701.70(B)(5)(a) (Page Sup~p. 1970).
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such approval; (2) The agreement conflicts with or changes the articles or regula-
tions of the surviving corporation then in effect or authorizes action which other-
wise would require such approval; (3) The merger involves the issuance or trans-
fer to the shareholders of the constituent corporations one-sixth or more of the
voting power of that corporation in the election of directors; or (4) The merger
agreement changes the directors of the surviving corporation in a manner which
otherwise would require action by the shareholders.
Subsection (E) provides for the notice of the shareholder meetings for ap-
proval of the merger or consolidation agreement. Subsection (F) provides for a
two-thirds majority vote of the shareholders of a constituent domestic corporation,
or such different proportion, greater than a majority, as the articles may provide, in
order to adopt the agreement to merge or consolidate. Subsection (G) permits
the abandonment of the agreement by the directors of any constituent corporation
prior to the filing of the certificate of merger, if authorized by the agreement, or
by the same vote of shareholders as required to adopt the agreement. Subsection
(H) provides that if the agreement does not have to be approved by the share-
holders of the surviving corporation under subsection (D) then the approval of the
directors constitutes approval by that corporation. Finally, Subsection (I) requires
that foreign constituent corporations comply with the laws of the state under which
they exist.
The procedures set forth in section 1701.78 are patterned after pre-existing law
but some provisions have been omitted. The new law eliminates the provisions per-
mitting shareholders to propose and adopt changes in the agreement without notice
at the meeting called to vote on the agreement. The merger or consolidation
agreement may no longer authorize directors to adopt regulations. Also eliminated
is the requirement that the agreement specify the stated capital and earned surplus,
or the method of determining them. The latter subject is now covered by section
1701.32.
(2) Merger or Consolidation into a Foreign Corporation-
Section 1701.79
New section 1701.79 replaces prior section 1701.82. This section is similar to
1701.78 except that it focuses upon a merger or consolidation where the surviving
corporation is a foreign corporation. Subsections (A) and (B) of section 1701.79
are nearly identical to those of 1701.78 except that subsection (B) requires that the
agreement give the location of the principal office of the surviving corporation and
the consent to be sued in Ohio by appointing the Secretary of State as its agent to
accept service of process. The agreement also must state whether or not the new
corporation desires to transact business in Ohio. The required approval of each
domestic constituent corporation is the same as under 1701.78. Subsection (E)
provides for abandonment of the agreement prior to the filing of such agreement
by the directors of any constituent corporation, if authorized to do so by the agree-
ment.
Subsection (G) marks the only substantial change from prior law. It provides
that if the new corporation does not desire to transact business in Ohio the agree-
ment shall be accompanied by the releases and certificates required by subsection
(H) of section 1701.86 with respect to each constituent domestic corporation and
each foreign corporation licensed to transact business in Ohio. This new section
omits the prior provision requiring such releases and certificates by the new or surviv-
ing foreign corporation, as if it were a dissolving corporation, and requires them
only from the constituent corporations.
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(3) Merger into a Parent Corporation-Section 1701.80
Section 1701.80 replaces previous Code section 1701.831 and deals with cases
of merger of a subsidiary into a parent corporation. This section applies regardless
of whether or not the parent is a domestic or foreign corporation so long as at
least one constituent corporation is a domestic corporation. The agreement for such
a merger must set forth: (a) The state under the laws of which each constituent
corporation exists; (b) that one or more constituents shall be merged into a sped-
fled surviving corporation; (c) the designation and the number of outstanding
shares of each dass of each constituent subsidiary and the numbers of shares of
each class owned by the surviving corporation; (d) the terms of the merger and
the manner of making distributions to the shareholders of each constituent subsid-
iary corporation; (e) all statements and matters required by the laws of the state
of any constituent foreign corporation; and (f) if desired, the effective date of the
merger, which may be on or after the date of filing the certificate.
Subsection (C) (1) requires that the agreement be approved by the directors
of each constituent corporation but need not be so approved by the shareholders of
any domestic constituent corporation. Foreign constituent corporations must follow
the laws of the foreign state with regard to shareholder approval. Subsection (C)
(2) requires the surviving corporation to deliver notice of approval to each share-
holder of each domestic corporation, other than the surviving corporation, within
twenty days of such approval.
The new section changes prior law in only one way. It reduces from one hundred
per cent to ninety per cent, the amount of outstanding shares of each class of each
subsidiary that need be owned by the parent for the parent to effect the merger
without the approval of its shareholders. If the parent is a domestic corporation
the conditions of 1701.78(D) (1), (2), (3) or (4) must not exist. If any of those
conditions do exist, or if the parent owns less than ninety per cent of the subsidiary's
outstanding stock then shareholder approval must be obtained.
(4) Certificate of Merger Or Consolidation-Section 1701.81
Section 1701.81 provides for the filing of merger or consolidation agreements
with the Secretary of State. The certificate to be filed must be signed by the chair-
man of the board or a vice president and the secretary, assistant secretary, treasurer
or assistant treasurer of each constituent corporation. It must also contain a signed
copy of the agreement and an indication of the manner in which it was approved.
Subsection (B) is new and requires each foreign constituent corporation to file the
proper papers as required by the laws of the state under which it exists. Subsec-
tions (C) and (D) deal with the effective date of the merger, which will be the
date of filing of the certificate unless otherwise stated in the agreement, and the
furnishing of information by the Secretary of State upon the payment of a small
fee, respectively. Other than subsection (B) no substantive change has been made
in pre-existing law.
(5) Effect of Merger or Consolidation-Section 1701.82
Provisions previously found in sections 1701.81 and 1701.83 dealing with the
effect of a merger or consolidation are now combined in section 1701.82. Subsec-
tion (A) of 1701.82 states that when the merger or consolidation becomes effec-
tive: (1) The separate existence of each constituent corporation ceases except to
the extent that a conveyance, assignment, transfer, deed or other instrument or act is
necessary to vest property or rights in the new corporation. In that case, the au-
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thority of the officers and directors of each constituent corporation continues until
such acts or conveyances are complete; (2) In the case of a consolidation, the new
corporation is incorporated when the consolidation becomes effective. If the new
corporation is a domestic corporation the agreement of consolidation operates as
original articles; (3) The surviving corporation possesses all assets and interests of
every description belonging to or due to each constituent corporation; (4) The sur-
viving corporation is liable for all the obligations of each constituent corporation;
and (5) All rights of creditors of each constituent corporation are preserved unim-
paired.
Subsection (B) provides that, in the case of a merger into a surviving foreign
corporation, and the agreement of merger states the intention to transact business in
Ohio, the new corporation shall be considered to have complied with the require-
ments for procuring a license to transact business in this state. Subsection (C)
establishes a ninety day statute of limitations, measured from the effective date of
the merger or consolidation, for any action to set aside the merger or consolidation
on the ground that any section of the Revised Code has not been complied with.
Subsection (D) defines "corporation," as used in that section, to apply to both
foreign and domestic corporations. It also states that the section is subject to the
laws of other states under which any constituent corporation exists or has property.
Section 1701.82 makes only one major change in prior law. The provision re-
quiring evaluation of the assets of the surviving corporation is omitted. The
former provision invited the abuse of writing up the assets and earned surplus.
The new law also recognizes that if foreign corporations are involved in the mer-
ger or consolidation they will be subject to the laws of the respective states per-
taining to the effect of mergers and consolidations.
(6) Combinations or Majority Share Acquisitions-Section 1701.83
Combinations and majority share acquisitions, previously dealt with in section
1701.84, are now covered in section 1701.83. Subsection (A) provides that to ef-
fect a combination or majority share acquisition the directors of the acquiring cor-
poration must authorize the transaction. The shareholders of the acquiring corpo-
ration must also approve the transaction if the articles or regulations so provide, or
if the transaction involves the issuance or transfer of such number of shares as en-
title the new holders to exercise one-sixth or more voting power in the election of
directors. If shareholder approval is required then such approval must be by a two-
thirds affirmative vote, or such different proportion as the articles provide, but not
less than a majority. Subsection (A) also provides that notice of the shareholder
meeting for approval be given to all shareholders whether or not they own voting
shares of stock. Subsections (B) and (C) provide for abandonment of the agree-
ment and establish a ninety day statute of limitations on actions to set aside the
combination or acquisition and do not differ from previous sections in that regard.
Section 1701.83 effects no substantial change in prior law. Previous section
1701.84(B) is eliminated as it dealt with earned surplus which is now covered in
new section 1701.32.
G. Surplus or "Pooling of Interests" Provisions
Amended section 1701.32 is a combination of previous provisions dealing with
the determination of earned surplus in case of a merger, consolidation combination
or dissolution of a subsidiary. Most of the changes are merely a reorganization of
prior sections and do not involve changes in the law. However, the provision in
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previous section 1701.32(a) relating to profits and gains from transactions in a cor-
poration's own shares has been omitted as unnecessary. Section 1701.32(B) pro-
viding that the source of capital surplus shall be shown on the books of the corpor-
ation was formerly subsection (C). Section 1701.32(C), which was formerly
(D), authorizes the directors to enter all or part of the fair value of property con-
tributed to the corporation, other than the corporation's own shares, on the books
as capital surplus. Subsection (D), which was formerly (E), authorizes the directors
to create or add to capital surplus by a write up of the physical assets of the corpora-
tion. Subsection (B) which authorizes the creation or addition to capital surplus
by writing up the value of shares held of another corporation is basically unchanged.
The new section 1701.32(H) consolidates the provisions relating to earned sur-
plus as affected by various forms of "pooling of interests." Subsection (1) pro-
vides that in the case of a merger the earned surplus of the surviving corporation
shall be the sum of the earned surpluses and/or deficits of the constituent corpora-
tions. The prior method of determining earned surplus in the merger or consoli-
dation situation was contained in section 1701.78 (B) (7). The amendment re-
moves the alternative method of determining earned surplus, which was the excess
of the fair value of the assets of the new or surviving corporation over the liabilities
and stated capital of the constituent corporations. The definitions of "surviving"
and "constituent" corporations were added to section 1701.01 by the amendment
and these terms are used throughout the corporation code.
Section 1701.32(H)(2) provides for the same method of determination of
earned surplus in the case of a consolidation. The method provided for in former
section 1701.81 (A) (10) is deleted. Section 1701.32(H) (3) provides for the
determination of earned surplus in the case of a combination. The earned surplus
of the acquiring corporation may be increased or diminished by adding the surplus
or deficit of the acquired corporation. This is merely a restatement of former sec-
tion 1701.83 (B) (1) and once again the alternative method provided by former
section 1701.84(B) (2) is deleted. Section 1701.32(H) (4) provides that earned
surplus is to be determined in the same way in the case of a dissolution of a wholly
owned subsidiary corporation into the parent corporation. The earned surplus of
the subsidiary is to be added to the earned surplus or deficit of the absorbing parent.
Section 1701.32 (H) (5) provides that any action taken by the directors in adding
to earned surplus by a method authorized by section 1701.32(H)(1-4) must be
taken within ninety days after the end of the fiscal year of such corporation in which
the merger, consolidation, combination or dissolution becomes effective.
H. Rights of Dissenting Shareholders
New section 1701.84 gathers in one section the provisions for relief of dis-
senting shareholders that were previously scattered throughout various sections. The
shareholders listed in divisions (A) through (D) are all entitled to relief under
section 1701.85. Division (A) provides for shareholders of the non-surviving
corporation which is being merged or consolidated into a new or surviving domes-
tic or foreign corporation. Shareholders of a surviving domestic corporation are
covered by division (B). Division (C) provides for 1701.85 relief for dissenting
shareholders of a subsidiary corporation which is being merged into the parent
corporation. Division (D) provides for the shareholders of the acquiring corpo-
ration who dissent to the acquisition of a majority of the shares of the acquired
corporation or the combination of the two corporations. The new section 1701.84 is
basically an index to those shareholders who are entitled to 1701.85 relief.
The new section 1701.85 revises the procedures for perfecting the rights of
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dissenting shareholders. The dissenting shareholder must deliver his written de-
mand for the fair cash value of his shares to the corporation no later than ten
days after the shareholder vote on the proposal. Previously the shareholder had
either ten days after the vote or thirty days from the notice of the meeting, which-
ever was later. In the case of a merger of a subsidiary into a parent under 1701.80,
wherein no shareholder vote is necessary, the dissenting shareholders have twenty
days from the notice of the approval of the merger in order to demand payment for
their shares. This division is new and is necessitated by the change in what is now
section 1701.80 which provides that the parent need own only ninety per cent of the
subsidiary to merge it without a vote of the shareholders.
Section 1701.85 (A) (5) provides that if the corporation, in answer to the de-
mand of a dissenting shareholder, requests his certificates and he fails to deliver
them to the corporation within fifteen days from the date the request was sent, the
corporation may terminate his rights at its option. A court may preserve the rights
of the dissenting shareholder if good cause is shown for his failure to deliver the
certificates.
Section 1701.85 (B) has been amended to provide that unless the dissenting share-
holder and the corporation agree on the fair cash value of the shares either may
file a petition in the court of Common Pleas within three months after the service
of the demand by the shareholder. Under the previous statute the amount de-
manded was deemed to be the fair cash value of the shares unless the corporation
notified the shareholder of its unwillingness to pay this amount and made a counter-
offer within ten days after the expiration of the period for shareholders demands.
The corporation no longer is bound by the demand of the shareholder in the ab-
sence of a counter-offer, and may file for a court determination of the fair cash
value within three months of the shareholder's demand. The number of court
appointed appraisers has been changed from a mandatory three to one or more and
their duties are to be specified in the order of appointment.
Section 1701.85 (D) (4) has added another situation in which the rights of the
dissenting shareholder are forfeited. If no agreement has been reached nor a peti-
tion filed for a court determination of fair cash value within three months of the
shareholder's demand, his right to payment of the fair cash value is terminated.
The changes to section 1701.85 require that a dissenting shareholder, in order
to protect his right to receive the fair cash value of this shares, make his written
demand within ten days of the vote or twenty days of his notice of a proposal for
which no vote was required. He must also tender his certificates within fifteen
days from the date of the sending of the corporation's request to him. Finally,
he must file a petition for the court determination of fair cash value within three
months of his original demand if no agreemnt has been reached in that time. The
changes provide deadlines that must be observed by the dissenting shareholder if
he is to protect his rights.
111. NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS
The amendments to the Ohio Corporation Act also make changes regarding
non-profit corporations. These amendments have the aim and effect of making the
non-profit corporation law parallel that which exists for corporations for profit.
A. Number and Qualifications of Incorporators
Section 1702.04(A) has been amended to conform with section 1701.04 with
regard to the number and qualifications of incorporators. The amended provision
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is nearly identical to 1701.04 and thus reduces the required number of incorpora-
tors for non-profit corporations to a single natural person, corporation or partner-
ship who need not be a resident of Ohio or a United States citizen.
B. Contents of Regulations-Section 1702.11(A)
Section 1702.11(A) has been amended to parallel the powers of corporations
for profit with regard to the adoption of "emergency regulations" which only
become effective before or during an emergency as defined in 1701.01(U). The
emergency regulations may make practical or necessary changes with respect to
meetings, committees, vacancies and temporary appointments of trustees, and the
rank and succession of officers, the same as may be done by corporations for profit
under section 1701.11(C).
Sections 1702.31 (Meetings of Trustees), 1702.32 (Quorum for Trustee's
Meeting), and 1702.34 (Officers: Authority and Removal) have also been amended
to include a provision subjecting them to the exceptions applicable under emergency
regulations. The new provisions will enable non-profit corporations engaged in
national defense research and non-profit corporations such as the Red Cross to func-
tion more effectively during a declared emergency situation.
C. Authority of Non-Profit Corporations-Section 1702.12
Under prior law it was not clear whether a non-profit corporation could form
or control a foreign corporation. The amendment to section 1702.12(F) makes
explicit that a non-profit corporation may acquire control of a foreign corporation.
D. Voluntary Dissolution-Section 1702.47
Under amended section 1702.47(F) the officers of a non-profit corporation are
permitted to file the certificate of dissolution at a date later than thirty days after
the adoption of the resolution. Previous law required such filings within thirty
days of the adoption of the resolution to dissolve. Now the certificate may be filed
upon the expiration of any period specified in the resolution as the period within
which such certificate is to be filed, or the thirty day period, whichever is later.
III. SEcuurrms LAw
(A) Institutional Investor-Section 1707.01
The new law amends the definition of "institutional investor" found in section
1707.01 (S). In the prior provision the words "engaged, as a substantial part of
its business or operation, in purchasing or holding securities" might have been read
to modify "any corporation, bank, insurance company, pension fund," etc. The
new section makes it clear that the clause modified only "any association."
(B) Exempt Transactions-Section 1707.03
Section 1707.03 (G) (2) has been amended to exempt from the registration re-
quirements of sections 1707.08 to 1707.11 the giving of a right to receive a security
upon exchange if the right is; (1) the subject matter of an exempt transaction;
(2) is registered by description or by qualification; or (3) is the subject matter of
a transaction which has been registered by description. The giving of a subscription
right, warrant, or option to purchase the security were exempt under pre-existing
law. The amendment adds "giving a right to receive a security to the exemption."
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The new law also reinstates as exempt those transactions in securities which
within one year were purchased outside of Ohio or within one year transported
into Ohio prior to the sale. Section 1707.03 (M) (3) (B), (C), (D) and (E) lists
the new exemptions. They are (1) securities of the same class registered within
one year on the basis provided in 1707.05 or which were qualified under 1707.09
for registration within one year; (2) those securities which, at the time of sale could
be registered by description as provided in section 1707.05; (3) securities sold on
behalf of a bona fide owner if the sale is made in good faith and; (4) those se-
curities transported into Ohio in transactions previously exempted or under registered
transactions. These listed transactions were exempt until 1967 but were deleted in
that year. The new law, then, re-establishes their exempt status.
C. Dealers License Required-Section 1707.14
Under former section 1707.14(B)(3) only a licensed securities dealer or an is-
suer selling its own securities could sell securities to "a bank, corporation or insur-
ance company."t The amended provision deletes the quoted phrase and substitutes
"an institutional investor" in its place. The effect of such a change is to broaden the
requirements to be licensed since the definition of institutional investor encom-
passes more than the three types of institutional investors listed under previous law.
IV. CONCLUSION
The 1970 amendments to the Ohio corporation law make few substantive changes
in prior law. Their overall effect is reorganizational with emphasis on those sec-
tions dealing with merger and consolidation. Additionally, minor changes were
made in the non-profit corporation law to bring it into line with the provisions
regulating corporations for profit. Finally, portions of the securities law have been
amended to provide new exempt transactions and to darify the language therein.
Michael P. Mahoney
Robert L. Rauzi
7 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.14(B)(3) as amaended, OHIo REV. CODR ANN. §
1707.14(B)(3) (Page Supp. 1970).
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